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“To the nation’s unions, [Labor Secretary] Solis’s prominent
role at the multilateral talks is a hopeful sign that workplace
issues are moving to the top of the international economic
agenda.”1
“But if [Obama] gives in to one more union petition against
China, he will sacrifice U.S. credibility as it seeks Beijing’s
cooperation on many other areas on which the two sides are
negotiating over disagreements, including better access to
China’s market for American companies or regional security in
Asia.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor unions are actively seeking to influence the enforcement and
formation of U.S. trade policy. In an effort to protect U.S. workers, labor
unions are filing an increasing number of actions based on existing trade
laws and agreements. They are also very actively exerting pressure to add
increased worker provisions in pending and future trade agreements. Is it
more than protectionist bravado? The current Obama administration appears
to be listening actively to labor concerns. While campaigning for the
presidency, candidate Barack Obama seemed to be in favor of free trade,
understanding that American workers must adjust to global competition. For
example, in a speech to workers in Flint, Michigan, he stated:
There are some who believe that we must try to turn back the
clock on this new world; that the only chance to maintain our
living standards is to build a fortress around America; to stop
trading with other countries, shut down immigration, and rely
on old industries. . . . Not only is it impossible to turn back the
tide of globalization, but efforts to do so can make us worse
off.3

1

Michael D. Goldhaber, Going Global, LAB. + EMP. AN AM. LAW SUPP., Spring 2010, at 8, 8.
Editorial, Obama’s Outsourced Trade Policy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Sept. 15, 2010, at 13.
3
Barack Obama, Presidential Candidate, Speech in Flint, Michigan (June 16, 2008), in THE
BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN’S PLAN FOR AMERICA 6 (2008), available at http://
www.setav.org/ups/dosya/28460.pdf.
2
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Later, Obama and Vice Presidential candidate Joseph Biden pledged to
undertake a number of steps to open up foreign markets and support
American jobs, including: “us[ing] trade agreements to spread good
labor . . . standards around the world”; to “pressure the World Trade
Organization to enforce trade agreements and stop countries from continuing
unfair government subsidies to foreign exporters and nontariff barriers on
U.S. exports”; to “work to ensure that China is no longer given a free pass to
undermine U.S. workers”; and to “make enforcement the top priority of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Office.”4 Obama campaigned on
promises of free and fair trade, which would both open up markets and help
U.S. workers learn to compete on a global level. Unfortunately, when he
took office, the country was in the midst of an economic crisis.5
The trade agenda ostensibly took a back seat to the more pressing concern
of economic recovery. A key aspect of that recovery, however, is trade. In
the 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama launched his National
Export Initiative, a plan to “double [U.S.] exports over the next five years, an
increase that will support two million [new] jobs in America.”6 Speculation
followed that labor unions were poised to have more political clout with the
Obama administration.7 The political backlash against free trade fueled
protectionist sentiment, which was undoubtedly exacerbated by the August
2010 surge in the U.S. trade deficit to $46.3 billion, with a record-breaking
$28 billion gap in trade with China.8 In September 2010, Public Citizen
produced a report claiming that “analysis of the actual outcomes of past U.S.
4

THE BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: OBAMA AND BIDEN’S PLAN FOR AMERICA, supra note 3; see
generally Okezie Chukwumerije, Obama’s Trade Policy: Trends, Prospects, and Portends, 16
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39 (2009) (discussing Obama’s approach to free trade during
his presidential campaign).
5
Lee Hudson Teslik, The U.S. Economic Stimulus Plan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 18,
2009), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-economic-stimulus-plan/p18348 (“President Barack
Obama took office in January 2009 facing the biggest global economic crisis since the Second
World War.”).
6
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-state-union-address).
7
See, e.g., Goldhaber, supra note 1 (positing that unions, with newfound political clout,
are aiming to link stricter labor standards to trade); Editorial, supra note 2 (suggesting that
Obama may sacrifice U.S. credibility with China if he succumbs to union pressure); Elizabeth
Williamson & Melanie Trottman, Obama Courts Labor Support for Trade Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 2010, at A2 (discussing Obama’s promises to labor unions to “enforce a range of
worker protections in new trade pacts in an effort to win labor’s support of a revised South
Korea free-trade agreement”).
8
Christine Hauser, U.S. Trade Deficit with China Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, at B3.
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FTAs [free trade agreements] show that the growth of U.S. exports to
countries that are not FTA partners is as much as double the growth of
exports to U.S. FTA partners.”9 Unemployment and a fragile economy
heightened fears, which manifested themselves in opposition to trade.
The link between labor, trade, and the elections further crystallized on
September 29, 2010, when the House passed the Currency Reform for Fair
Trade Act (CRFTA).10 This Act was designed to give the President
expanded authority to impose tariffs on a wide range of Chinese imports to
the U.S.11 Following the vote, American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) President Richard Trumka declared,
“[t]his November we will send a powerful message that we will support
those who vote for an economy that works for everyone.”12 Labor union
members comprise a significant “voting bloc of more than 17 million
[voters].”13 According to exit polls, in 2008, “23% of the electorate were
[from union] households.”14 Although it never became law, CRFTA
embodied the heightened concern Congress and voters were feeling about
trade, especially with China.15
Then, in October 2010, a poll revealed that 53% of Americans “said freetrade agreements have hurt the U.S.”16 Perhaps most surprising, however,
was that the poll showed that “upper-income, well-educated

9

TRAVIS MCARTHUR & TODD TUCKER, PUB. CITIZEN’S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, LIES,
DAMN LIES AND EXPORT STATISTICS: HOW CORPORATE LOBBYISTS DISTORT RECORD OF
FLAWED TRADE DEALS 3 (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FTA%20Pen
alty%20Paper%20FINAL1.pdf.
10
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, H.R. 2378, 111th Cong. (2010). The vote was 348–
79, with 99 Republicans voting in favor. David E. Sanger & Sewell Chan, Eye on China,
House Votes for Greater Tariff Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at B1. As of October 13,
2010, the Bill had been received in the Senate, read twice, and referred to the Committee on
Finance; it was immediately met with mixed reactions. Compare Donald L. Luskin, Op-Ed.,
The Trade and Tax Doomsday Clocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at A25 (arguing that the
CRFTA has the potential to be dangerously protectionist), with Paul Krugman, Op-Ed.,
Taking On China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at A25 (asserting that the Bill is a positive step to
deal with China).
11
H.R. 2378.
12
Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka on the
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.aflcio.org/Pres
s-Room/Press-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-President-Richard-Trumka-On-t21.
13
Melanie Trottman, Unions Make Vote Push, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at A6.
14
Id.
15
H.R. 2378.
16
Sara Murray & Douglas Belkin, Americans Sour on Trade, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2010, at
A1.
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professionals . . . are increasingly skeptical [about free trade].”17 In the 2010
mid-term elections, some Democrats blamed their Republican opponents for
supporting free trade policies that have cost millions of Americans their
jobs.18 In turn, this backlash against free trade prompted politicians from
both parties to use “unfair trade” talking points.19 This general opposition to
trade stalled ratification of the pending free trade agreements with Korea,
Colombia, and Panama for another year.20
To complicate the mix even further, the Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) program designed to help workers who lost their jobs due to the
impact of international trade, expired in February 2011.21 The Obama
Administration said that it would not submit the pending free trade
agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama to Congress until there was
agreement to renew the TAA.22 According to U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), Ron Kirk, the “administration believes that just as we should be
excited about the prospect of selling more of what we make around the
world, we have to be equally firm about keeping faith with America’s
workers.”23 The TAA has strong support from labor unions, especially from
AFL-CIO President Trumka, who called the program “ ‘a lifeline for
working people trying to get the skills necessary to change careers after their
lives have been turned upside down.’ ”24 Understanding the political utility
of the program, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also supports the TAA.25
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)26 also expired in February
2011.27 “The objective of the [ATPA] is to promote broad-based economic
17

Id.
Thomas Fitzgerald, Democrats in Race See Free Trade as Fair Game, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 7, 2010, at A01.
19
Douglas A. Irwin, Goodbye, Free Trade?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2010, at C1.
20
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk on Congressional Passage of Trade Agreements, Trade Adjustment
Assistance and Key Preference Programs (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Kirk on Congressional
Passage], available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/state
ment-us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-congres.
21
Trade Act Program—Overview, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/progra
moverview.cfm (last updated Feb. 11, 2011).
22
Binyamin Appelbaum, Ultimatum Holding Up Trade Deals, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011,
at B1.
23
Id.
24
Mike Hall, White House Says No Trade Deals Until TAA Strengthened, AFL-CIO NOW
(May 17, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Economy/White-House-Says-No-Trade-Deals-U
ntil-TAA-Strengthened.
25
Elizabeth Williamson, Trade Pacts Tied to Worker Aid, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2011, at A7.
26
Andean Trade Preference Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (codified in
18
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development” and to help undermine drug trafficking “by providing
sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production in beneficiary
countries.”28 Senate Democrats will not support the ATPA until the TAA
passes.29 Moreover, the extension of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP),30 which expired in December 2010,31 has also been blocked, denying
developing countries preferential access to U.S. markets.32 One last
consideration is that there have been calls to renew the Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA or Fast-Track),33 which is not a priority for the Obama
administration.34 Under the TPA, which was scheduled to expire in 2007,35
Congress grants the President the authority to negotiate free trade agreements
(subject to congressional rules), providing trade partners with assurance that
“the final agreements will be given swift and unamended consideration.”36
All of these trade issues are interrelated and steeped in politics. The result
was that the Obama Administration and Congress were at a significant set of
interrelated impasses,37 until the passage of the three pending free trade
agreements, as well as the TAA reforms, the GSP and ATPA in October
2011.38
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (2010)).
27
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by USTR Ron Kirk on
Need to Support American Workers by Extending Important Trade Programs (Feb. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Kirk on Need to Support], available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pr
ess-releases/2011/february/statement-ustr-ron-kirk-need-support-american-wor.
28
Id.
29
Editorial, No Way to Run a Trade Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A26.
30
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006).
31
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
32
Kirk on Need to Support, supra note 27.
33
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813 (2006).
34
Vicki Needham, Trade Deals Could Be Ready Next Week, ON THE MONEY: THE HILL’S FIN.
& ECON. BLOG (June 16, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1005-trade/166997-tradedeals-could-be-ready-next-week; see generally MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22608, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) RENEWAL: CORE LABOR STANDARDS ISSUES: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 (2007) (noting that within the debate about renewing the TPA is the issue of
“whether to include enforceable core labor standards as a principal negotiating objective in trade
agreements”).
35
BOLLE, supra note 34, at 1.
36
J.F. HORNBECK & WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33743, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY (2012).
37
See Editorial, supra note 29 (criticizing Republican lawmakers for blocking the TAA
unless the White House promises to advance the Colombia FTA and Democratic lawmakers
for refusing to support the ATPA until the TAA passes).
38
Kirk on Congressional Passage, supra note 20.
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Although the U.S. international trade deficit in goods and services
decreased in April 2011 to $43.2 billion,39 with nearly a $21.6 billion gap in
trade with China,40 much work needs to be done to “rebuild the domestic
consensus on trade.”41 To that end, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative is making it clear that “[u]nions, NGOs, and small businesses
that have felt shut out of the trade policy process now have a seat at the
table.”42 The prominence of labor is also evident in the President’s 2011
Trade Policy Agenda (the Agenda). The Agenda states: “We will continue to
actively enforce U.S. rights under our trade agreements. We will conduct
these efforts based on high standards that reflect American values on labor
and on the environment, and on public engagement and transparency.”43 The
Agenda explicitly states that free trade agreement “labor obligations will be
treated the same as commercial obligations and that the United States will
expect our trading partners to meet their obligations on labor.”44 This
emphasis on labor represents a significant and important shift in trade policy.
It is against this backdrop that this research will analyze the influence of
labor unions on U.S. trade policy. The degree to which labor is influencing
the U.S. trade agenda is central to this Article and its recommendations,
which are divided into five areas of inquiry. Part I reviews selected actions
asserted by labor unions over the decade prior to the Obama Administration,
with particular emphasis on the Bush Administration’s steel tariffs. Part II
analyzes two actions taken in 2009; one halting the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) plan to allow trucks from Mexico into the U.S.,
and a second that placed tariffs on tires imported from China. This Part also
incorporates the new trucking agreement that resolved he dispute with
Mexico. Part III considers the pending Dominican Republic-Central
39

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 1992 - PRESENT, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/exhibit_history.
pdf (last visited May 2, 2012).
40
TRADE IN GOODS WITH CHINA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trad
e/balance/c5700.html (last visited May 2, 2012).
41
Demetrios J. Marantis, Ambassador & Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks at the
University of Georgia: The Future of International Trade (Feb. 18, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2011/february/remarks-ambassad
or-demetrios-marantis-unive).
42
Id.
43
RONALD KIRK, 2011 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE 1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 TRADE POLICY AGENDA], available at http://www.
ustr.gov/webfm_send/2597.
44
Id. at 149.
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America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) request for
consultations with Guatemala for labor rights violations. Part IV details the
United Steel Workers Section 301 Action against China related to green
technology industries. Part V reviews the labor provisions in the recently
ratified free trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama. This
Article evaluates the extent to which labor unions are driving U.S. trade
policy under the Obama Administration, and, based on that investigation,
Part VI considers the future of labor unions’ ability to balance domestic and
international worker concerns with a forward-looking trade policy.45
Ultimately, this Article argues for protection of workers from unfair
competition and advocates for stronger measures in free trade agreements to
improve labor practices and conditions for workers in other countries to
ensure that they are consistent with fundamental labor rights.
II. BACKGROUND: ACTIONS ASSERTED BY LABOR UNIONS OVER THE LAST
DECADE
Selected actions asserted by labor unions over the decade prior to the
Obama Administration provide the background for the current revitalization
of labor’s involvement in trade. On June 5, 2001, President George W. Bush
asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to commence a
Section 201 investigation.46 A Section 201 investigation is authorized under
the Trade Act of 1974 to provide import relief to “facilitate a domestic
industry’s positive adjustment to import competition,”47 or, in other words, to
create a level trading field when a domestic industry is being injured due to
45

See generally Christian Barry & Sanjay G. Reddy, International Trade and Labor
Standards: A Proposal for Linkage, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545 (2006) (advocating for the
improvement of working conditions and living standards in poor countries without imposing
undue burdens); Kevin Kolben, A Development Approach to Trade and Labor Regimes, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 356 (2010) (arguing for “an ‘Integrative Linkage’ approach to
trade and labor regimes”); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The “Helping Hand” in Trade
Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade
Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004) (proposing a model for labor standards in free
trade agreements); Andrea R. Schmidt, Note, A New Trade Policy for America: Do Labor and
Environmental Provisions in Trade Agreements Serve Social Interests or Special Interests?,
19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 167, 168 (2009) (using economic theory to assert “that labor
and environmental standards in trade agreements are vulnerable to manipulation and
exploitation by various protectionist groups”).
46
STEPHEN COONEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21152, STEEL: KEY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
1 (2002).
47
VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32371, TRADE REMEDIES: A PRIMER 19
(2008).
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an influx of imports. The Bush Administration was responding to “requests
from Congress, union representatives and steel companies” to investigate the
effects of imported steel on the domestic industry.48 Bankruptcy filings by
thirty-one steel firms, the idling of tens of thousands of workers, and falling
steel prices (a twenty-year low) prompted the petition.49 Based on the
information presented, the ITC ruled that steel imports were causing severe
injury to the U.S. steel industry and that the President had the authority to
proclaim import tariffs on foreign steel.50 Acting on this decision, the Bush
Administration imposed 8% to 30% tariffs on steel imports, mostly against
imports from the European Union, China, Japan, South Korea, and the
former Soviet states.51
This move was criticized severely for the overall detrimental effect on
steel consumers in the U.S.,52 as well as the way in which the tariffs
compromised international credibility on the U.S. commitment to free
trade.53 Although steel mills added jobs, steel consumers shredded jobs
because of the tariffs.54 In March 2002, the European Union requested
consultations in the World Trade Organization (WTO).55 Shortly thereafter,
China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland joined the
European Union in challenging the steel tariffs as violating WTO rules,56
prompting the Bush Administration to begin a series of exemptions for
certain products in June 2002.57 Thereafter, on July 11, 2003, the WTO

48

COONEY, supra note 46.
Impact of the Section 201 Safeguard Action on Certain Steel Products: Hearing Before
the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 6, 1st Sess.
(2003) (statement of Representative Sander M. Levin, Member, H. Subcomm. on Trade).
50
Steel, Inv. No. TA-201-73, USITC Pub. 3479 (Dec. 2001) (Final).
51
Press Release, George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Announces Temporary
Safeguards for Steel Industry (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archiv
es.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-6.html; Edward Gresser, Toughest on the Poor:
America’s Flawed Tariff System, Foreign Aff., Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 9, 9.
52
Mike Allen & Jonathan Weisman, Steel Tariffs Appear to Have Backfired on Bush, WASH.
POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A01.
53
Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs, 21 BERK. J. INT’L
L. 825, 827 (2003).
54
Allen & Weisman, supra note 52.
55
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States – Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/1 (Mar. 7, 2002).
56
Procedural Agreement Between the United States and China, et al., United States –
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/13 (July 15,
2002).
57
Steel Tariffs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2002), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/sto
ry.php?storyId=1144560.
49
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ruled that the U.S.-imposed steel tariffs were illegal.58 Despite this ruling,
President Bush preserved the tariffs.59 On September 19, 2003, the ITC
submitted its midterm report to the White House, presenting three options:
continue the existing safeguards, modify the safeguards, or lift the safeguards
altogether.60 United Steel Workers (USW) contended that the steel tariffs
were working as designed and should be continued.61 In November 2003,
however, the WTO Appellate Body confirmed that each of the safeguard
measures were in violation of WTO rules.62 On December 4, 2003, President
Bush signed a proclamation ending the safeguards.63
These politically motivated tariffs injured American businesses, workers,
and consumers who relied on foreign steel. This action was viewed as
forsaking free trade principles to aid steel mills in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia—“two states crucial for [Bush’s] reelection.”64 Karl Rove was an
advocate of the tariffs for strategic political purposes.65 Even U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick admitted that politics was behind the steel
tariffs: “[W]e have to manage political support for free trade at
home . . . . [W]e have to create coalitions.”66 Any short-term protectionist
advantage for the U.S. steel industry was undercut by the overall harm.
Anticipating that perhaps the steel tariffs signaled the Bush
Administration’s willingness to cooperate with labor about their concerns
with global competition, the AFL-CIO filed two petitions.67 First, in 2004,
the AFL-CIO filed the first workers’ rights case against the Chinese
government, contending that exploitation of Chinese workers created unfair
competition.68 Specifically, the petition was based on Section 301 of the
58
Panel Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel
Products, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003).
59
Restructuring American Steel: Safeguard Tariffs and the Politics of Unfair Trade, UNITED
STEEL WORKERS (Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.usw.org/our_union/workplaces?id=0004.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Press Release No. 69/03, European Union, EU Welcomes WTO Ruling Confirming US
Steel Tariffs Are Illegal (Nov. 10, 2003), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/20
03/2003069.htm.
63
Proclamation No. 7741, 68 Fed. Reg. 235 (Dec. 8, 2003); Press Release, George W.
Bush, U.S. President, President’s Statement on Steel (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://Georg
ewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031204-5.html.
64
Allen & Weisman, supra note 52.
65
Editorial, Steel Thyself, Karl Rove, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A12.
66
Jennifer L. Rich, U.S. Admits That Politics Was Behind Steel Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2002, at W1.
67
See Paul Blustein, Labor Seeks Pressure on China, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at E03.
68
See id.
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Trade Act of 197469 and alleged unfair trade practices by the Chinese
government.70 Six weeks later, four Bush Administration cabinet members
held a press conference to reject the petition.71 Inasmuch as there was no
meaningful change for Chinese workers over the next two years, the AFLCIO submitted a new petition to the White House in 2006, alleging violations
of workers’ rights by suppressing strikes, banning independent unions, and
permitting factories to violate minimum wage and child labor laws.72 On
July 21, 2006, the White House rejected the second petition.73 At that point,
it was relatively clear that the Bush Administration was not interested in
pursuing these kinds of unfair trade actions against China. The landscape for
labor, however, shifted with the Obama Administration.
III. MEXICAN TRUCKS AND CHINESE TIRES
Two key actions in 2009, one involving trucks entering the U.S. from
Mexico and the other tires imported from China, provided an early indication
of the Obama Administration’s receptiveness to positions advocated by labor
groups. In the case of the Mexican trucks, pursuant to obligations under
NAFTA, the U.S. initiated the Cross-Border Demonstration Project in 2007
for one year.74 The program allowed a limited number of Mexican trucks to
deliver goods within the U.S.,75 as opposed to handing over the goods to U.S.
truckers at the border. In the spring of 2008, the U.S. Department of
Transportation issued an Interim Report concluding that the low number of
carriers participating in the program was insufficient to determine reliably

69

Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006).
Press Release, AFL-CIO, Bush Administration Officially Rejects AFL-CIO Section 301
Trade Petition (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Press-Release
s/Bush-Administration-Officially-Rejects-AFL-CIO-Sec.
71
Id.
72
Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO Secr’y-Treasurer Trumka on Bush
Administration’s Rejection of 301 Petition Against Chinese Government (July 21, 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 Rejection of 301 Petition], available at http://www.aflcio.org/Press-Room/Pre
ss-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-Secretary-Treasurer-Trumka-on; see generally THOMAS
LUM & DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31403, CHINA’S TRADE WITH THE UNITED
STATES AND THE WORLD (2007) (detailing the surge in imports from China, including the threat
posed to U.S. industries and manufacturing employment).
73
2006 Rejection of 301 Petition, supra note 72.
74
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Office of Inspector Gen., Statement on
Announcement of Cross-Border Truck Safety Pilot Plan 1 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/DOT_OIG_Stmt_Ltrhead2.pdf.
75
Id.
70
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the safety of Mexican carriers.76 Then, the project was extended in August
2008 for two additional years.77
With the enthusiastic support of the U.S. Teamsters Union, however, the
2009 appropriations bill blocked funding for the pilot program.78 Signing the
bill prohibited the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration from using
appropriated funds to continue the project,79 thus killing the program. In
March 2009, Mexico immediately retaliated by placing $2.4 billion in tariffs
on about ninety U.S. products imported into Mexico.80 In August 2010,
Mexico followed up with an expanded list of U.S. goods subject to tariffs,
including some U.S. pork and cheese products, as well as chewing gum,
ketchup, and corn.81 The tariffs were selected to affect products from regions
throughout the U.S.82 The dispute placed President Obama in a difficult
position.83 The tariffs were counterproductive to his goal of doubling exports
from the U.S.84 On the other hand, given the opposition of labor groups to
any trucking program, he was at risk of alienating key union support in the
midst of the midterm elections.85
Well after the mid-term elections and well before the next major election
cycle, President Obama and Mexican President Calderon announced they
had reached an agreement resolving the cross-border trucking dispute.86
Pursuant to the March 2011 plan, half of the tariffs on U.S. goods were to be
lifted immediately. The remaining tariffs are to be lifted when the first
Mexican carrier receives authorization to truck goods into the U.S. pursuant
to the new program.87 Thereafter, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
76

U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INTERIM REPORT ON NAFTA
CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 3 (2008), http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/
files/pdfdocs/Interim_NAFTA_Report_with_508.pdf.
77
Notice of Extension of Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions, 73 Fed.
Reg. 45,796 (Aug. 6, 2008).
78
Notice of Termination of Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions, 74
Fed. Reg. 11,628 (Mar. 18, 2009).
79
Id.
80
Mexico: Tariffs Placed on U.S. Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at B10.
81
Scott Horsley, Mexico Slaps Tariffs on U.S. Products in Truck Dispute (National Public
Radio broadcast Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=129282803.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See supra text accompanying note 6.
85
Horsley, supra note 81.
86
Elizabeth Williamson, U.S., Mexico Agree to Settle Truck Feud, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4,
2011, at A1.
87
Id.
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Administration requested public comment on the details of the agreement.88
The two key features under the new pilot program are that (1) Mexicodomiciled motor carriers are allowed to operate in the U.S. for up to three
years (with reciprocal rights for U.S.-domiciled motor carriers); and (2)
“Mexican carriers and drivers [are] required to comply with all applicable
U.S. laws and regulation,” including those pertaining to safety, registration,
taxation and immigration.89 More specifically, the process for applying for
participation in the pilot program begins with a twenty-eight page application
that gathers specific information about the carrier, its affiliations, its
insurance, its safety programs, and its compliance with U.S. laws.90 In
addition to providing general information, the carrier must complete up to
thirty-five safety and compliance certifications and provide information
regarding its systems for monitoring hours of service and crashes and
complying with Department of Transportation (DOT) drug and alcohol
testing requirements.91
The proposal is designed to be a rigorous process to ensure the safety of
Mexican trucks on U.S. highways. The current plan contains more safety
requirements than the previous program.92 For example, the current program
requires that “Mexican trucks undergo a ‘full inspection’ ” (as opposed to
being merely “checked”) to determine if “the carrier ha[s] passed a preauthority safety audit . . . and whether the driver ha[s] a valid license and [is]
proficient in English.”93
During the public comment period, a bipartisan group of forty-four
members of Congress joined together in a letter to the DOT to express
concerns over the agreement, particularly road safety and border security
breaches.94 The letter concludes by strongly opposing the proposal and
stating that the “current system of Mexican carriers operating within a
defined commercial zone is working well for both safety and border

88

Request for Comment Pilot Program on NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, 77
Fed. Reg. 40,938–41 (July 11, 2011).
89
Id.
90
FMCSA Proposes Details of Mexico Trucking Pilot Program, TRUCKINGINFO (Apr. 12,
2011), http://www.truckinginfo.com/news/news-detail.asp?news_id=73510.
91
Id.
92
JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41821, STATUS OF MEXICAN TRUCKS IN THE
UNITED STATES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2011).
93
Id.
94
Letter from Duncan Hunter et al., Member of Congress, U.S., to Ray LaHood, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Transp. (May 4, 2011), available at http://hunter.house.gov/images/stories/HunterLipi
nski_Trucking_Letter.pdf.
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security.”95 Not surprisingly, the Teamsters also oppose the proposed plan.96
According to Teamsters General President Jimmy Hoffa, the proposal “fails
to adequately protect our members, their families and the traveling public
from the potential danger of unsafe Mexican trucks and drivers, who do not
meet or will not adhere to all U.S. safety standards.”97 The Teamsters urged
the Obama Administration to challenge the tariffs imposed by Mexico
instead of negotiating a trucking program.98 Similarly, the Owner-Operated
Independent Drivers Association (OODIA) maintained that the tariffs should
be challenged and that the “administration’s failure to challenge those tariffs
has jeopardized the livelihoods of millions of truckers and other
Americans.”99
Inasmuch as the U.S. is required under NAFTA to allow the trucks into
the U.S.,100 this alternative approach was not reasonable. Mexico was
exercising its right to impose retaliatory tariffs, not “harass[ing] [the U.S.]
into lowering [safety] standards, as alleged by the OODIA.”101 The public
comment period closed in May 2011102 amidst ongoing concern that the
three-year pilot program will result in U.S. drivers losing their jobs—the real
issue fueling opposition to the program.103
In July 2011, the U.S. and Mexico signed a new trucking deal, with both
countries agreeing to drop their trade barriers for a three-year trial period.104
95

Id.
Hoffa: The Public Opposes Illegal, Unsafe Mexican Truck Program, TEAMSTERS (May 16,
2011), http://www.teamster.org/content/hoffa-public-opposes-illegal-unsafe-mexican-truck-prog
ram.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Press Release, Owner-Operated Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Truckers Outraged: U.S. & Mexico
Trucking Agreement (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.ooida.com/MediaCenter/Press_Rel
eases/pressrelease.asp?prid=189.
100
In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-200801, Final Report of the NAFTA Arbitral Panel (2001), http://registry.nafta-sec-alena.org/cmdocu
ments/8f70c18a-7f02-4126-96f6-182a11c90517.pdf.
101
Press Release, supra note 99.
102
Request for Comment Pilot Program on NAFTA Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 40,980; see also Pilot Program on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Long-Haul Trucking Provisions, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.fmcsa.dot
gov/rules-regulations/administration/rulemakings/notices/US-MX-agreement-FR-notice.aspx
(last visited May 2, 2012).
103
See, e.g., FRITTELLI, supra note 92, at 6–7 (describing opposition from the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and independent owner-operator truck drivers).
104
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Transportation of the United
States of America and the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes of the United Mexican
States on International Freight Cross-Border Trucking Services art. 2, U.S.-Mex., July 6, 2011,
96
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Pursuant to the Agreement, Mexican carriers are now able to apply for
permits to allow them to drive their trucks in the U.S.105 Significantly,
Mexico agreed to drop 50% of its retaliatory tariffs within ten days of
signing the agreement, with a complete suspension of all tariffs as soon as
the first Mexican carrier is granted authority, provisional or full, under the
trucking agreement.106 “Mexican tariffs [currently] range from five to 25
percent on . . . U.S. products such as apples, certain pork products, and
personal care goods.”107 Following seventeen years of dispute over this
trucking issue, and billions of dollars in punitive tariffs imposed against
Mexico by the United States,108 the U.S. and Mexico finally appear to have a
trucking pilot program in place that balances safety concerns with the rights
of Mexican truckers under NAFTA.
The second major trade-related action by the Obama Administration in
2009 involved an April petition by the United Steel Workers (USW). Filed
under Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974, the petition’s subject was tires
imported from China.109 The International Trade Commission subsequently
determined that certain tires from China were “being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities or under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the domestic producers of like
or directly competitive products.”110 The ITC proposed imposing duties on
all such tires for a three-year period.111 At that time, President Obama had
the authority to make the final decision.112 Despite international opposition,

available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/Mexican_MOU_Eng.pdf.
105
Id.
106
Letter from Miriam Sapiro, U.S. Ambassador, to Beatriza Leycegui Gardoqui, Undersec’y
for Int’l Trade for Mex. (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2959.
107
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk: Mexico to Drop
Retaliatory Tariffs by Fifty Percent (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/2011/july/ustr-kirk-friday-mexico-drop-retaliatory-tariffs-fift.
108
Williamson, supra note 86.
109
Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW Seeks Relief from Flood of Imported Chinese
Tires (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_advisories?id=
0155.
110
Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, USITC Announces Determination I China
Safeguard Investigation Concerning Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires (June
18, 2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2009/er0618gg1.htm;
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China, Inv. No. TA-421-7, USITC
Pub. 4085 (July 2009) (Final) [hereinafter Certain Passenger Vehicle Decision].
111
Certain Passenger Vehicle Decision, supra note 110, at 1.
112
Id. at 30.
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the President announced that the U.S. would levy tariffs up to 35% on tires
imported from China.113
Outside of limited labor circles, the decision was immediately met with
worldwide criticism calling the measures unfairly protectionist.114 Ironically,
the Tire Industry Association (TIA) in the U.S. opposed the tariffs,
expressing concerns that they would result in substantial job losses and
increased costs to consumers.115 China immediately alleged protectionism
and responded by calling for talks with the U.S. at the WTO.116 China
challenged the U.S. measures restricting imports on certain Chinese tires and
requested the WTO establish a panel to determine the measures’ consistency
with WTO obligations.117 The U.S. maintained the measures were necessary
safeguards, noting that “in just four years, U.S. tyre imports from China
more than tripled in volume and the value of the imports rose to USD 1.8
billion. . . . [while U.S. production fell] by 25 per cent, [and] 14 per cent of
US workers in the industry had lost their jobs.”118
In December 2010, the WTO upheld the validity of the tariffs, finding
that “in imposing the transitional safeguards measure . . . the United States
did not fail to comply with its [WTO] obligations.”119 The U.S. responded
by calling the decision “a major victory for the United States and particularly
for American workers and businesses. . . . [T]his outcome demonstrates that
the Obama Administration is strongly committed to using and defending our

113

Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Kirk: White House Fulfilling
Trade Enforcement Pledge with Announcement of Remedies in Chinese Tire Case (Sept. 11,
2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/September/
kirk-white-house-fulfilling-trade-enforcement-pl.
114
See, e.g., Daniel Ikenson, Burning Rubber: Proposed Duties on Chinese Tires Whiff of
Senseless Protectionism (Free Trade Bull., No. 39, Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/FTB-039.pdf (contending the duties are a protectionist
response to “Big Labor”).
115
Press Release, Tire Indus. Ass’n, Tire Industry Association Expresses Disappointment
with President’s Decision Concerning Chinese Tire Tariff (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://
forms.tireindustry.org/news.asp.
116
Zhu Shaobin & Ma Shukun, China: U.S. Tire Tariff Sends “Wrong Signal” to World,
XINHUANET (Sept. 13, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/13/content_12043010.
htm.
117
DSB Sets up Panels on US – Tyres (China) and Philippines – Taxes on Spirits, Adopts
Reports on China – Publications and AV Products, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 19, 2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dsb_19jan10_e.htm.
118
Id.
119
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle
and Light Truck Tyres From China, at 113, WT/DS399/R (Dec. 13, 2010).
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trade remedy laws to address harm to our workers and industries.”120
Likewise, the decision was an important victory for the USW, which
announced that it planned to “continue working with the administration to
take full advantage of all enforcement tools available . . . so that the benefits
of fair trade are made available to all Americans.”121
In March 2011, the TIA renewed its opposition to the tariffs, stating that
the “petition was not filed by the manufacturers suffering from a ‘market
disruption;’ it was a disaffected union.”122 The TIA is trying to persuade
Congress to monitor the following areas to determine the effect of the tariffs:
U.S. production of consumer tires (including production of
private brands and other entry-level tires), changes in
employment at U.S. tire production facilities, changes in
consumer tire imports from countries other than China, retail
price trends for domestic and imported tires (including specific
price trends in low-income areas of the United States), and
changes in employment levels in the tire distribution and retail
sectors.123
The TIA continues to actively oppose the tariffs.124 On May 24, 2011, China
notified the WTO “of its decision to appeal to the Appellate Body certain
issues of law and legal interpretation covered in the [WTO] panel report.”125
In both the Chinese and Mexican cases, President Obama’s actions
largely were consistent with the position advocated by certain domestic labor
groups. Both actions, however, were met by domestic and international
criticism, suggesting that the U.S. stance was motivated by protectionism and
short-term politics. Although President Obama may have garnered support
120

Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Prevails in WTO
Section 421 Safeguard Dispute with China (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ab
out-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-prevails-wto-section-421-safegu
ard.
121
Press Release, Leo W. Gerard, President, United Steel Workers, USW President Gerard
Statement: U.S. Prevails Before WTO in China Challenge of Tire Trade Case (Dec. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_advisories?id=0347.
122
Press Release, Tire Indus. Ass’n, Chinese Tire Tariff (Mar. 2011), available at http://
www.tireindustry.org/default.aspx?id=1598.
123
Id.
124
Id. (indicating no change in the TIA’s stance on the Chinese tire tariff issue).
125
United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light
Truck Tyres from China, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/c
ases_e/ds399_e.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2011).
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from selected vocal labor groups, his initial position on the Mexican trucks
and his support of the tire tariffs belied a commitment to free trade.
IV. CAFTA-DR: ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR PROVISIONS
A key focus of the Bush Administration was negotiating a number of free
trade agreements, including CAFTA-DR, which was ratified in 2005.126 One
of the most contentious issues was the opposition of labor to the
agreement.127 Many people believed that the labor provisions were not
adequate to protect U.S. workers.128 In fact, Barack Obama, as a junior
senator from Illinois, opposed CAFTA-DR because it did “less to protect
labor than previous trade agreements.”129 Acknowledging that “[t]he
question is not whether we can stop [globalization], but how we respond to
it,” Senator Obama asserted that it is “not whether we should protect our
workers from competition, but what we can do to fully enable them to
compete against workers all over the world.”130 Now, as President, he is in
the position of enforcing the CAFTA-DR provisions.
Overall, the CAFTA-DR labor provisions fall short of offering any
significant protection for workers, both in the U.S. and other member
countries.131 Although the parties agree to “strive to ensure” that the labor
126
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreem
ents/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text; Press Release, George W. Bush,
U.S. President, President Signs CAFTA-DR (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-wh
itehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050802-2.html.
127
See, e.g., Lionel Beehner, Q&A: The CAFTA Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_071805.html?pagewanted=print (detailing opposition
from organized labor and workers’ rights groups).
128
See, e.g., Kathy Schalch, CAFTA Encounters Opposition from Labor (National Public
Radio broadcast May 28, 2005) (describing opposition from labor groups alleging that
workers’ rights are routinely abused in CAFTA-DR countries).
129
Op-Ed., Barack Obama, Why I Oppose CAFTA, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 2005, at 27.
130
Id.
131
Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 386, 432–39 (2005). For a critique of the adequacy of the labor chapter
in CAFTA-DR, see generally Paula Church Albertson, The Evolution of Labor Provisions in
U.S. Free Trade Agreements: Lessons Learned and Remaining Questions Examining the
Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),
21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 493 (2010); Lyndsay D. Speece, Comment, Beyond Borders:
CAFTA’s Role in Shaping Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements, 37 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1101 (2007); Brandie Ballard Wade, Comment, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why
They Fail Workers and Provide Dangerous Precedent for the FTAA, 13 LAW & BUS. REV.
AMERICAS 645 (2007).
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principles in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (ILO
Declaration), as well as “internationally recognized labor rights . . . are
recognized and protected by its law,”132 this is an aspirational goal, not a
mandatory one. Pursuant to the labor provisions in CAFTA-DR, each
member country (Party) pledged to “not fail to effectively enforce its [own]
labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a
manner affecting trade between the Parties. . . .”133 The Parties, however,
“retai[n] the right to exercise discretion” with respect to investigating,
prosecuting, regulating, and complying with “other labor matters determined
to have higher priorities.”134
If a Party believes that a violation of the Labor Chapter (Chapter 16)
exists, it may request “consultations” by submitting a written request135
containing “information that is specific and sufficient to enable the [alleged
offending Party] to respond.136 The Parties are then to make “every attempt
to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution”137 within sixty days of the
request.138 If the Parties are unable to resolve the matter, then either Party
“may request that the Council be convened to consider the matter. . . .”139 At
such a proceeding, the Council may consult with “outside experts.”140
Failure by a Party to enforce its own labor laws can subject the Party to
binding dispute settlement and, ultimately, fines or sanctions.141 The

132

CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 16.1(1). CAFTA-DR defines “internationally
recognized labor rights” as
(a) the right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and
elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health.
Id. art. 16.8.
133
Id. art. 16.2(1)(a).
134
Id. art. 16.2(1)(b).
135
Id. art. 16.6(1).
136
Id. art. 16.6(2).
137
Id. art. 16.6(3).
138
Id. art. 16.6(6).
139
Id. art. 16.6(4). “The Council shall consist of the cabinet-level representatives of the
consulting Parties or their high-level designees.” Id. at n.2.
140
Id. art. 16.6(5).
141
Id. art. 16.6(6).
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maximum fine is set at USD 15 million per year, per violation.142 The fines,
however, do not get paid to the injured Party—instead they may be directed
toward remedying the labor violation.143 Although the labor provisions are
more “robust” than earlier free trade agreements,144 they do not require full
incorporation of ILO standards.145
The following sections consider the merits of the current CAFTA-DR
requests for consultations with Guatemala regarding labor rights violations
and possible action against Costa Rica.
A. Guatemala
Even before CAFTA-DR was ratified, it was well known that labor
activists are targets for attacks and threats in Guatemala.146 Additionally,
violations, including of the right to association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, and the prohibitions on
child labor, were all documented by the U.S. Department of State.147 Nearly
two years after CAFTA-DR went into effect, reports of labor violations in
Guatemala persisted; the director of the Commission for the Verification of
Codes of Conduct, the “Guatemalan group hired by multinational companies
to inspect local factories,” was quoted as stating, “[t]he law hasn’t been
reformed, and people just don’t obey the law. There’s a culture of
impunity.”148 Further underscoring this sentiment, the International Trade
Union Confederation (ITUC) produced a March 2008 report detailing trade
union rights violations, including violence against union organizers,

142

Id. art. 20.17(2).
Id. art. 20.17(4)
144
William (Bud) Clatanoff, Labor Standards in Recent U.S. Trade Agreements, 5 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 109, 114 (2005). For an elaboration, see Pagnattaro, supra note 131, at
432–39 (detailing how CAFTA fails to measure up to certain international negotiation
objectives).
145
See discussion infra Parts V, VI.
146
Pagnattaro, supra note 131, at 416. In 2006, CAFTA-DR entered into force in Guatemala.
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominic
an-republic-central-america-fta (last visited May 21, 2012).
147
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA:
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2004, sec. 6(a) (2005), available at http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41762.htm.
148
Peter S. Goodman, Labor Rights in Guatemala Aided Little by Trade Deal, WASH. POST,
Mar. 16, 2007, at A1.
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discrimination, harsh working conditions, violence against women, and
problems with child labor.149
In April 2008, the AFL-CIO, along with six Guatemalan unions, filed a
submission, referred to as Submission 2008-01 (Guatemala), with the U.S.
Department of Labor alleging Guatemala’s systematic failure to enforce its
labor laws and its failure to take reasonable action to prevent violence
against trade unionists.150 The petition includes details of five individual
cases, including the assassination of the General Secretary for STEPQ
(Union of Port Quetzal Company Workers); the murder of a union officer for
SITRABI (Union of Izabal Banana Workers); the failure to enforce labor
laws and the refusal to bargain with the legally recognized union,
SITRAINPROCSA (Union of International Frozen Products, Inc. Workers);
the dismissal and blacklisting of worker representatives of the Coalition of
Avandia Workers; and the dismissal of workers participating in or supporting
a SITRAFRIBO (Union of Fribo Company Workers) union drive.151 The
Annex to Submission 2008-01 (Guatemala) contains additional cases of
violence, occurring primarily in 2008, including allegations of murder,
shootings, harassment, and gang rape.152 Later in 2008, the Solidarity
Center, a nonprofit organization established to provide assistance to workers
seeking to unionize, produced a 118-page report setting forth the
discouraging labor conditions, including violence against workers, violations
of basic workers’ rights, discrimination, child labor, and abuse of migrant
workers.153
Despite mounting evidence of egregious labor conditions in Guatemala,
the Bush Administration took no action. In January 2009, the U.S.
Department of Labor published a report of its review of Submission 2008-01
(Guatemala).154 The report details violence against trade unionists and
149

GUATEMALA: TRADE UNIONS AT THE HEART OF THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY, INT’L
TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (2008), available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/VS_Gu
atemala_EN.pdf.
150
AFL-CIO et al., Public Submission Concerning the Failure of the Government of
Guatemala to Effectively Enforce Its Labor Laws and Comply with Its Commitments Under
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (2008), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/GuatemalaSubmission2008.pdf.
151
Id. at 2–3.
152
Id. at 24.
153
SOLIDARITY CTR., JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA
(2008), available at http://www.solidaritycenter.org/files/pubs_guatemala_wr.pdf.
154
OFFICE OF TRADE & LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF
OFFICE OF TRADE AND LABOR AFFAIRS U.S. SUBMISSION 2008-01 (GUATEMALA) (2009),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/otla/20090116Guatemala.pdf.
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mistreatment of workers in Guatemala, including unlawful dismissal and
refusal to pay legal severance.155 Inasmuch as the Guatemalan government
and President Álvaro Colom were demonstrating a willingness to discuss the
issues raised in the submission, “the OTLA [did] not recommend requesting
consultations pursuant to . . . CAFTA-DR.”156 Thereafter, an eleven-month
in-house examination concluded that Guatemala did not uphold its
obligations to ensure the freedom of assembly, right to collective bargaining,
right to organize, and decent work conditions.157 This was further
corroborated by an ITUC survey discussing sixteen union-related murders in
Guatemala in 2009158 and the 2009 Guatemala Country Report by the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. State Department
(Country Report).159 According to the Country Report, a wide variety of
serious problems persist in Guatemala, including killings of trade unionists,
discrimination, and “ineffective enforcement of labor laws and child labor
provisions.”160
In July 2010, the Obama Administration responded by requesting
pursuant to CAFTA-DR consultations with the Guatemalan government to
address workers’ rights violations.161 The U.S. announced that it was
committed to “using every option available in the trade enforcement
playbook to help sustain jobs here in America.”162 In a speech delivered at
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Id. at 5–28.
Id. at vi.
157
The results of this investigation have not been made public. Interview with Laura Buffo,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Sept. 15, 2010).
158
ITUC Annual Survey: 101 Trade Unionists Murdered in 2009; Pressure on Workers’
Rights Grows as Crisis Hits Jobs, INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (June 9, 2010), http://
www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-annual-survey.html?lang=en.
159
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTS: GUATEMALA (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/
wha/136114.htm.
160
Id.
161
Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, & Hilda L. Solis, U.S. Sec’y of Lab.,
to Erick Haroldo Coyoy Echeverría, Guat.Minister of Econ., & Edgar Alfredo Rodríguez,
Guat. Minister of Lab. & Soc. Prot.. (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm
_send/2114; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., U.S. Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis
Announces Labor Consultation with Guatemala Under CAFTA-DR Agreement (July 30,
2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ilab/ILAB20101078.htm#UPYhoB1
QWSo.
162
Ron Kirk, Tough Trade Enforcement Supports Jobs for American Workers, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (July 30, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/30/tough-trade-enfor
cement-supports-jobs-american-workers.
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Allegheny Technologies in Pennsylvania, USTR Ron Kirk discussed the
Guatemala action, stating that
[W]ith this case, we are sending a strong message that our
trading partners must protect their own workers, that the
Obama Administration will not tolerate labor violations that
place U.S. workers at a disadvantage, and that we are prepared
to enforce the full spectrum of American trade rights from
labor to the environment.163
The AFL-CIO applauded the decision to pursue labor consultations with
Guatemala, stating it signaled “the strong commitment of the Obama
Administration’s to enforcing our trade laws, including the obligation to
respect workers’ rights.”164 Similarly, labor groups in Guatemala supported
the U.S. action.165 Guatemalan apparel and textile producers, however, were
concerned about the decision to pursue labor violations, being unsure of the
ramifications.166 In 2009, Guatemala exported eleven billion dollars in
apparel to the U.S.167
Pursuant to the CAFTA-DR dispute resolution procedures,168 the Parties
then attempted to resolve the dispute within sixty days.169 Confidential
consultations were held on September 8–9, 2010, and Guatemala allegedly
provided information about enforcement of its labor laws while also
163

Ron Kirk, U.S. Ambassador, Remarks on Enforcement at Allegheny Technologies, Inc.
(July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Allegheny Technologies] (transcript available at http://www.ustr.
gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2010/july/remarks-ambassador-ron-kirk-enforce
ment-alleghn).
164
Press Release, AFL-CIO, Statement by AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka on
Announcement of Guatemala Labor Rights Case (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.aflcio.
org/index.php/Press-Room/Press-Releases/Statement-by-AFL-CIO-President-Richard-Trumkaon-A.
165
Four Years After CAFTA-DR: A Coup and Incessant Violence Against Workers, U.S.
LAB. EDUC. IN THE AMERICAS PROJECT, Summer 2010, at 4, available at http://usleap.org/file
s/newsletters/Summer2010.pdf.
166
Deborah Belgum, Guatemala Reacts to Allegations of Labor Violations, APPARELNEWS.NET
(Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.apparelnews.net/news/international/081310-Guatemala-Reacts-to-All
egations-of-Labor-Violations.
167
Id.
168
CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 16.6(6).
169
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Announces Labor
Rights Trade Enforcement Case Against Guatemala (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.us
tr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/july/united-states-trade-representative-kirk-ann
ounces-lab.
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recognizing that cooperative activities between the two countries must be
strengthened.170 Guatemala also reported that it shared information about the
plan, established since President Colom took office in 2008, related to the
actions that must be undertaken to strengthen Guatemala’s labor
framework.171
The sixty-day consultation period passed without any resolution. On May
16, 2011, the U.S. requested a meeting of the Free Trade Commission,
pursuant to CAFTA-DR dispute resolution procedures.172 According to
USTR Kirk, “[the U.S. has] identified a significant number of apparent
failures by the Government of Guatemala to enforce its labor laws. While
Guatemala has taken some positive steps over the past several months, its
actions and proposals have been insufficient to address what we view as
systemic failures.”173 “This is the first labor case ever brought by the United
States against a [free] trade agreement partner.”174 The USW expressed
“strong support” for this enforcement action.175
If a dispute resolution panel finds that Guatemala has failed to enforce
effectively its labor laws, it may impose an annual monetary assessment of
up to USD fifteen million dollars, adjusted for inflation.176 This is a very
interesting test case. On the one hand, reports indicate that the labor
violations are, in fact, systemic and, by virtue of the level of violence, very
troubling.177 On the other hand, the dispute mechanism and remedies
provided for under CAFTA-DR could be much more rigorous. It is
especially regrettable that there is a cap on damages and that labor violations
170

Press Release, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, Comunicado de Prensa
Sobre las Consultas Cooperativas Ministeriales de Conformidad con el Capitulo 16 del DRCAFTA (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.minex.gob.gt/noticias/Noticia.aspx?id=468.
171
Id.
172
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Kirk Seeks Enforcement
of Labor Laws in Guatemala (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pres
s-office/press-releases/2011/may/ustr-kirk-seeks-enforcement-labor-laws-guatemala.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW Declares Support of U.S. Guatemala Labor
Rights Case (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/news_articles?id
=0829.
176
CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, art. 20.17(2).
177
See INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATIONS OF
TRADE UNION RIGHTS — GUATEMALA (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/doc
id/4ea6620bc.html (identifying the increasing number of trade union deaths as trade members
continue to carry out activities while vulnerable to assassination, attacks, threats, smear
campaigns, infiltration, and the like from Guatemala’s de facto power groups despite formal
protections written in the law).
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are not subject to the same treatment as commercial disputes, as this reduces
their potential effectiveness.178 This lacking should signal the need for better
recourse in future trade agreements to ensure adequate enforcement of labor
laws, especially when a lack of enforcement affects trade between the
parties.179
B. Costa Rica
Another CAFTA-DR action is also pending—this one against Costa Rica.
In July 2010, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and
two Costa Rican unions filed a complaint with the Office of Trade and Labor
Affairs (OTLA).180 The action alleges that the Government of Costa Rica is
engaged in “serious and repeated failures” to enforce its labor laws in
violation of CAFTA-DR.181 As of the date of this Article, no action has been
taken on the complaint by the U.S. government, but the USTR has pledged to
“make sure that all U.S. workers have the opportunity to compete on a level
playing field.”182
V. UNITED STEEL WORKERS SECTION 301 PETITION AGAINST CHINA
Early on, the Obama Administration expressed its willingness to work
with China “to create new opportunities for our workers and our firms to
compete equally. . . .”183 Slow to rebound from the global economic crisis,
178

CAFTA-DR, supra note 126, arts. 20.20–.22 (stating only that arbitration should be
highly encouraged and not limiting dispute resolution in any other way).
179
See infra Part VI.
180
Submission to the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, Int’l Longshore & Warehouse
Union, Coast Longshore Division et al., Complaint Concerning the Failure of the Government
of Costa Rica to Effectively Enforce Its Labor Laws Under the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (July 20, 2010) [hereinafter ILWU Submission],
available at http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/07-20-10-IL
WU-SINTRAJAP-ANEP-DR-CAFTA-Complaint-to-OTLA-Concerning-the-Government-of-C
osta-Ricas-Failure-to-Follow-its-Labor-Laws-Under-the-ILO.pdf; ILWU Files CAFTA
Complaint Against the Costa Rican Government, LONGSHORE & SHIPPING NEWS (July 22, 2010),
http://www.longshoreshippingnews.com/2010/07/ilwu-files-cafta-complaint-against-the-costa-ri
can-government/.
181
ILWU Submission, supra note 180, at 1.
182
Allegheny Technologies, supra note 163.
183
Hillary Clinton & Timothy Geithner, Op-Ed, A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue
with China, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 27, 2009, at 15. To this end, the editorial concluded with a
Chinese aphorism: “When you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river peacefully
together.” Id.
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unions in the U.S. continued to look for ways to level the international
playing field. The United Steel Workers’ (USW) Section 301 Action against
China, related to green technology industries,184 took labor to a new level in
the realm of enforcement of trade rules. Pursuant to Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act, a petition may be filed if a foreign government is (1) denying the
U.S. its rights under a trade agreement or (2) engaging in unjustifiable,
unreasonable, or discriminatory acts, policies, or practices that burden or
restrict U.S. commerce.185 On September 9, 2010, the USW filed a 5,800page petition asking the U.S. to take action.186
The USW asserts that China engages in illegal predatory practices that
“stimulate and protect its domestic producers of green technology, from wind
and solar energy products to advanced batteries and energy-efficient
vehicles,” in violation of WTO rules.187 The petition details five categories
of problematic green technology policies.188
The first category is
“restrictions on access to critical materials,” derived from “rare earth
elements and other minerals” that are critical to green technologies.189 These
raw materials are essential for use in green technologies, such as “solar
panels, wind turbines, advanced batteries, [and] energy-efficient
lighting. . . .”190 This assertion is particularly significant, as China currently
controls over 95% of the world’s rare earth elements mines.191 In October
2010, Beijing signaled that it might further decrease exports in 2011, creating
heightened alarm for China’s trading partners.192 Alarmingly, “[b]y closing
or nationalizing . . . producers of rare earth metals,” China consolidated its
control of rare earths in 2011 and drove up prices to the detriment of
companies producing energy-efficient bulbs and other green energy
products.193
184
Complaint, Petition for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended:
China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technology, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter USW Green 301 Action], available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09-09-2010%20Petition.pdf.
185
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006).
186
USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184; Press Release, United Steel Workers, USW
Files Trade Case to Preserve Clean, Green Manufacturing Jobs in America (Sept. 9, 2010),
available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_advisories?id=0327.
187
USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184, at 1.
188
Id. at 2–5.
189
Id. at 2.
190
Id.
191
Keith Bradsher, China Plans to Reduce Its Exports of Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2010, at B4.
192
Id.
193
Keith Bradsher, China Consolidates Grip on Rare Earths, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at
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The second category listed in the USW Section 301 Action addresses
China’s “subsidies that are contingent on export performance or on the use of
domestic over imported goods.”194 The subsidies, particularly for wind
turbine manufacturing, allegedly allow China to “freely undercut and outbid
U.S. exporters of green technology products around the world.”195 The third
category involves “discrimination against foreign firms and goods” through
China’s policy of “bid[ding] out the construction of wind farms and solar
power plants,” granting the winners concessions and the guaranteed right to
purchase power produced by government-owned utilities.196 The fourth
category pertains to China’s laws requiring the transfer of advanced
technology in foreign venture agreements, which are subject to government
approval.197 According to the USW petition, as a practical matter, “foreign
firms’ investment agreements with state-owned partners or state financiers
invariably contain requirements to transfer technology,” in violation of
China’s commitment to the WTO that it will not “require that foreign
companies transfer technology as a condition of investment approvals.”198
This so-called “technology for market” strategy199 is drawing criticism from
corporations such as GE and Siemens AG.200
Lastly, the petition alleges that China is engaged in a broad range of
“trade-distorting domestic subsidies.”201 As an example, the USW cites
China’s stimulus package containing more than “$216 billion to subsidize
green technologies.”202 The USW asked the U.S. to take action pursuant to
Section 301 to enforce the rights of the U.S. pursuant to WTO rules,203
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and
China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO.204 The petition concludes by
B1.
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USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184, at 3.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 4.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.; see also Andrew Browne, Immelt on China: They Won’t Let Us Win, CHINA REAL
TIME REP. (July 2, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/07/02/immelt-on-chinathey-wont-let-us-win/ (“Jeffrey Immelt, the CEO of General Electric, has become the latest
high-profile U.S. business leader to sound off about China.”); Jason Dean, China Is Coming
Under Fire, WALL ST. J. ASIA, July 20, 2010, at 4 (“[C]onglomerate Siemens AG raised
complaints about a range of Chinese policies toward foreign business . . . .”).
201
USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184, at 5.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 6.
204
Id. at 9.
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stating that “these policies have given Chinese producers an upper hand in
accessing investment, technology, raw materials, and markets, while denying
these same opportunities to U.S. producers.”205
On September 28, 2010, 181 Members of Congress sent a letter to
President Obama supporting the USW petition and expressing their concern
about China’s practices related to green technology.206 Just days later, fortythree members of the Senate sent a similar letter to President Obama, in
“strong support” of the USN 301 Petition, urging him to take “immediate and
aggressive action.”207 On October 15, 2010, USTR Kirk announced that he
was commencing a formal investigation into the allegations.208 USTR Kirk
further asserted that to the extent that any allegations are supported by
sufficient evidence, the U.S. would “vigorously pursue the
enforcement . . . through WTO litigation.”209
China called the move
“baseless and irresponsible,” adding that “[i]t is sending a wrong signal of
trade protectionism to the rest of the world.”210 The move was met with
immediate praise from the USW, claiming “President Obama showed
again . . . that fighting for U.S. workers and their jobs is his top priority.”211
Lest there be any doubt about the USW’s efforts to send a strong signal
about the importance of labor and its influence on trade during the mid-term
elections, USW President Leo Gerard released an emphatic reminder that
“[a]s the election approaches, voters should ask every candidate whether they
support a trade policy that creates jobs and wealth here at home . . . .”212
The U.S. then requested consultations with China under WTO dispute
settlement provisions concerning a program known as the “Special Fund for

205

Id. at 207.
Letter from Sander Levine et al., U.S. Member of Congress, to Barack Obama, U.S. President
(Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/letter_president.pdf.
207
Press Release, United Steel Workers, U.S. Senate Letter to Obama Supports USW 301
Petition on China (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/releases_adviso
ries?id=0334.
208
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Launches Section
301 Investigation into China’s Policies Affecting Trade and Investment in Green
Technologies (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/node/6227.
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Id.
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China Hits Back at U.S. Investigation into Its Clean Energy Policies, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/72909/20101018/china-clean-energy-green-t
echnology-us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-world-trade-organization-wto-so.htm.
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Press Release, United Steel Workers, Steelworkers Applaud Obama Administration
Acceptance of Trade Case (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.usw.org/media_center/rel
eases_advisories?id=0335.
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Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.”213 This is one of the issues
raised by the USW 301 Petition.214 In support of the request, USTR Kirk
stated: “These subsidies effectively operate as a barrier to U.S. exports to
China . . . . Our decision . . . underscores our commitment to ensuring a level
playing field with China for American workers and businesses.”215 The
European Union and Japan joined the consultations in January 2011.216 In a
victory for the USW and the U.S., China ended its Special Fund for
Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.217
Although the U.S. has not yet requested WTO consultations on the other
issues raised in the USW 301 Petition, it may decide to pursue the first issue
regarding rare earths. World prices doubled in the first four months of 2011,
with the reason pointing directly at “China’s chokehold on the market.”218
China recently established environmental standards governing the production
of rare earth minerals, claiming that the measures are necessary to ensure the
“sector’s sustainable development.”219 China could attempt to argue against
a WTO action by asserting that it qualifies for an environmental protection
exception to WTO rules banning export restrictions to enable it to conserve
its natural resources.220 To do so, however, it would need to demonstrate that
it is restricting consumption of its own industries.221 Speculation is that the
U.S. is unlikely to challenge China’s rare earth export restraints until
resolution of a similar WTO challenge by the U.S. against China on raw
213

Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Concerning Wind
Power Equipment, WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010).
214
USW Green 301 Action, supra note 184, at 66–69.
215
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Requests WTO
Dispute Settlement Consultations on China’s Subsidies for Wind Power Equipment
Manufacturers (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2010/december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con.
216
Request to Join Consultations by the European Union, China – Measures Concerning
Wind Power, WT/DS419/2 (Jan. 12, 2011); Request to Join Consultations by Japan, China –
Measures Concerning Wind Power, WT/DS419/3 (Jan. 17, 2011).
217
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, China Ends Wind Power
Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute (June 7, 2011), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-eq
uipment-subsidies-challenged.
218
Keith Bradsher, Supplies Squeezed, Rare Earth Surge, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, at B1.
219
China Issued Green Standards for Rare Earths, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7303697.html.
220
See generally JOSEPH SCHIAVO, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, CHINA,
THE WTO, AND THE RACE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY (2011), available at http://www.iddri.org/
Publications/Collections/Analyses/AN_1101_schiavo%20guerin_china%20wto%20renewable%
20energy.pdf.
221
Id.
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materials export restraints.222 In April 2011, the WTO ruled against China223
and in July the WTO held that China “violated global rules by restricting
exports of nine raw materials used in the manufacturing of high technology
products.”224 In so doing, the WTO “rejected China’s argument that its
restrictions were motivated by a desire to protect the environment and
prevent a critical shortage of the materials.”225 Significantly, this decision
paves the way for a challenge to China’s restrictions on rare earth metals.
VI. “EXPANDING THE ENFORCEMENT PLAYBOOK”: THREE NEW FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
After considering the context for the protection of labor rights in trade
agreements, this Part reviews the labor provisions in the recently ratified free
trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama. All three agreements
were negotiated and signed by the Bush Administration, and the Obama
Administration engaged in the process of refining those agreements before
sending them to Congress for approval.226 Although he made significant
efforts, President Bush was unable to secure enough support for the
agreements before leaving office. After a significant amount of negotiation
both at home and abroad, the Obama Administration was able to secure
ratification of the three agreements.227
The most vocal opposition to these three free trade agreements was from
labor advocates who argued that the labor provisions in free trade agreements
were not adequate to protect workers.228 Pursuant to the Trade Promotion
222
USTR Likely to Delay Rare Earths Case Until Raw Materials Panel Rules, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE’S NEWSSTAND (June 15, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/Inside-US-China-Trade/Insid eUS-China-Trade-06/15/2011/menu-id-715.html; see generally Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, United States Files WTO Case Against China Over Export Restrictions on
Raw Materials (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-rel
eases/2009/june/united-states-files-wto-case-against-china-over-expor (detailing the issues raised
in the request for consultations).
223
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/AB/R (Jan. 30, 2012).
224
Stephen Castle, W.T.O. Says Chinese Limits on Raw Material Exports Break Global
Trade Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at B3.
225
Id.
226
See Scott Horsley, S. Korea Trade Deal May Be Delayed By Other Pacts (National Public
Radio broadcast Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/03/07/134316904/s-koreatrade-deal-may-be-delayed-by-other-pacts (discussing the push by Republicans in the U.S.
House of Representatives to consider all three agreements together).
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See Kirk on Congressional Passage, supra note 20.
228
See, e.g., Eli J. Kirschner, Note, Fast Track Authority and Its Implication for Labor
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Authority (TPA), “principal negotiating objectives” must be met for specific
issues, including labor.229 Specifically, parties to free trade agreements with
the U.S. were required
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United
States does not fail to effectively enforce its . . . labor laws,
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in
a manner affecting trade between the United States and that
party after entry into force of a trade agreement between those
countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the
right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory,
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement
with respect to other labor or environmental matters
determined to have higher priorities, and to recognize that a
country is effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or
inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or
results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of
resources, and no retaliation may be authorized based on the
exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor
standards . . . ;
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as defined
in section 3813(6) of this title).230
The TPA defined “core labor standards” to mean:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

the right of association;
the right to organize and bargain collectively;
a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
a minimum age for the employment of children;
and

Protection in Free Trade Agreements, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 385, 386 (2011) (noting labor
advocates strong objections to the South Korean free trade agreement).
229
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority of 2002 § 2102, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11) (2006).
230
Id. § 3802(b)(11)(A)–(C).
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acceptable conditions of work with respect to
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational
safety and health.231

This attempt to incorporate labor standards into trade agreements was an
overture to labor groups, yet it did not require trading partners to undertake
more substantial protections for workers. In 2005, Congress ratified
CAFTA-DR by a very narrow margin, barely overcoming labor concerns.232
This led to A New Trade Policy for America or Bipartisan Agreement on
Trade Policy (Bipartisan Agreement) between the Bush Administration and
congressional leaders in 2007, aiming to elevate labor requirements in trade
agreements.233
In accordance with the Bipartisan Agreement, free trade agreements must
include a template of four enforceable labor commitments.234 First, trading
partners are required to make an enforceable commitment to
adopt and maintain in their laws and practice the five basic
internationally-recognized labor principles, [articulated] in the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work:
• Freedom of association;
• The effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining;
• The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor;
• The effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on
the worst forms of child labor; and
• The elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.235
231

Id. § 3813(6)(A)–(E).
Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by 2 Votes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1.
233
STAFF OF WAYS & MEANS COMM., POSITION PAPER, A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR AMERICA
(2007), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/enewsletter/5-11-07/07%2005%20
10%20new%20trade%20policy%20outline.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
TRADE FACTS: LABOR (2007) [hereinafter BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR], available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file627_11284.pdf.
234
BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR, supra note 233, at 1; MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS 4 (2008).
232
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Second, the countries must agree to enforce effectively their labor laws
and not to lower their labor standards.236 Third, the agreement sets new
limits on “ ‘prosecutorial’ and ‘enforcement’ discretion—FTA countries
cannot defend the failure to enforce laws related to the five basic standards
due to resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement
issues.”237 A violation of these standards requires “showing that nonenforcement of labor obligations occurred through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction.”238 Lastly, labor obligations are subject to the
same dispute mechanisms and penalties as commercial obligations, with
fines and trade sanctions available as remedies assessed based on the amount
of trade injury.239 To be actionable, a violation “must occur in a manner
affecting trade or investment between the parties,” and “[o]nly a government
can invoke dispute settlement against [another] government for a labor
violation” under a free trade agreement.240 This prevents unions and
businesses from commencing a dispute proceeding against a member
country.
The Teamsters’ response to that last requirement in the Bipartisan
Agreement was mixed.241 Although the Teamsters were pleased that the
“negotiations have resulted in enforceable labor and environmental chapters,
including making core International Labor Organization standards
enforceable,” they contended that this “ ‘deal’ is NO DEAL for the
Teamsters or American workers, and [that they would] fight like hell to
oppose this shortsighted agreement.”242 The Korea, Colombia, and Panama
trade agreements were all negotiated under the TPA and the more rigorous
requirements of the Bipartisan Agreement.243
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BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT: LABOR, supra note 233, at 1; see generally INT’L LABOUR OFFICE,
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USTR Kirk has vowed to “expan[d] [the] enforcement playbook.”244
Although it is unclear what he means, as is discussed below, labor concerns
resulted in additional negotiations of the Korea and Panama agreements.245
Unions continue to call for increased protections for workers—both domestic
and international—as well as increased enforcement mechanisms in the
pending free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and Korea.246
Currently, all three agreements contain provisions stronger than CAFTADR,247 yet they still fall far short of what labor advocates deem acceptable to
protect American jobs.248 In fact, in a June 15, 2011 letter to the members of
the U.S. House of Representatives, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters asserts that “[a]ll three [trade] agreements are modeled after the
job-killing [NAFTA].”249 The Teamsters however, overlook that, unlike the
labor provisions in NAFTA, the ones in the Korea, Colombia, and Panama
trade agreements are in the main body of the agreement—not merely in a
side agreement—and are fully enforceable.250 The Teamsters also claim that
the free trade agreements will “result in job losses” and “will further exploit
workers and deny basic human rights.”251 A few days after Teamsters’ letter,
on June 20, 2011, the USW expressed vocal opposition to the pending Korea,
Colombia, and Panama agreements in a letter to all of the members of the
House and the Senate.252 The USW opposed the trade agreements because of
244
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246
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its foundation on the “failed NAFTA model” and “because they do not
adequately address the changing nature of trade and accelerating
globalization.”253 The Teamsters and USW, however, did not suggest actual
provisions to strengthen the agreements. Moreover, they ignore the fact that
the trade agreements contain four enforceable labor concepts, as agreed upon
in the Bipartisan Agreement, that significantly increase worker
protections.254
At the end of June 2011, the Senate Finance Committee scheduled
informal, or “mock,” markups of the three pending trade agreements,
including the inclusion of the TAA in the implementing bill.255 Ultimately,
in October 2011, the three agreements were ratified.256
A. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
“The United States and the Republic of Korea signed the United StatesKorea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on June 30, 2007,” with
Congress approving it in October 2011.257 A significant reason why this
agreement remained pending for over four years was opposition from labor
groups, particularly that related to the automotive trade.258 The Obama
Administration have every incentive to address labor opposition because of

253
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See infra Parts V.A–C.
255
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committee formally considers legislation to implement a pending trade agreement. Id.
256
Kirk on Congressional Passage, supra note 20.
257
U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the
U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited May 4, 2012) [hereinafter
New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the U.S. Korea Trade Agreement].
258
International Trade and Investment Policy, UNITED AUTO., AEROSPACE & AGRIC.
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AM. (UAW) (last visited May 2, 2012), http://www.uaw.org/page/in
ternational-trade-and-investment-policy (“The UAW strongly opposes . . . KORUS FTA[,]
[which] would further open the U.S. market to increased automotive imports from Korea,
while allowing the Korean government to continue to use a variety of non-tariff barriers to
keep their market effectively closed to U.S.-built products. As a result, this trade deal would
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and jobs in the United States at a time when the financial recovery of the domestic auto
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restructuring and preserving the domestic automakers.”).
254

698

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:663

the high stakes for the U.S. with this agreement, which is expected to add
“around $10 billion to annual merchandise exports to Korea.”259
Initial concerns voiced by labor groups are contained in the Labor
Advisory Committee’s (LAC) April 2007 report on KORUS FTA.260 The
LAC report was highly critical of KORUS FTA, stating that “[the
agreement] will not protect the fundamental human rights of workers in
either the United States or Korea.”261 The report’s primary objection was
that KORUS FTA contained “essentially the same flawed labor chapter
found in [CAFTA-DR].”262 Specifically, KORUS FTA (1) did not “contain
enforceable provisions requiring that the government meet its obligations
under the ILO core labor standards”; (2) did not “prevent Korea from
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws to
encourage trade or investment”; (3) did not “require that Korea effectively
enforce its own laws with respect to employment discrimination”; (4)
“cap[ped] the maximum fine at $15 million”; and (5) required “the violating
country pa[y] the fine to a joint commission to improve labor rights
enforcement, [with] the fine end[ing] up back in [the violating country’s]
own territory.”263 All of these criticisms were, understandably, an echo of
those that nearly prevented the approval of CAFTA-DR.264
The May 2007 Bipartisan Agreement, however, largely addressed these
concerns.265 In its final form, the Labor Chapter of KORUS FTA (Article
19)266 incorporates the key template requirements outlined in the Bipartisan
Agreements.267 Specifically, each Party to KORUS FTA must “adopt and
maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO Declaration;268
“[n]either Party shall fail to effectively enforce its labor laws”;269 “[n]either
Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its obligations regarding the

259
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note 257.
260
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261
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ILO fundamental principles;270 and “[e]ach Party “shall provide that parties
to such proceedings may seek remedies to ensure the enforcement of their
rights under its labor laws.”271 It is important to note that “[t]o establish a
violation of [the Labor Chapter] a Party must demonstrate that the other
Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute, regulation, or practice in a
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.”272 If there is a
violation of Article 19, the aggrieved Party may seek labor consultations and,
if that is not successful, dispute resolution as provided for in Article 22,
Institutional Provisions and Dispute Settlement.273
Despite these changes, opposition from labor and other groups persisted.
In September 2010, over 550 groups ranging from family farm, labor, and
manufacturing groups to consumer groups sent a letter to President Obama
opposing KORUS FTA.274 Specifically citing the inadequacy of the Labor
Chapter, the groups describe the KORUS FTA as a “throwback to a failed
trade policy,” stating that they “oppose more of these same job-killing,
community destroying trade policies.”275 The letter asserts that KORUS
FTA “includes the Bush administration’s explicit ban on reference to the
International Labor Organization’s core Conventions.”276 It is important to
note, however, that the Labor Chapter in KORUS refers explicitly to
compulsory obligations related to the ILO Declaration.277 The Obama
Administration then undertook “an unprecedented level of input from
stakeholders, including industry and labor” in connection with additional
negotiations with Korea.278
After a series of meetings during the fall of 2010,279 the U.S. and South
Korea reached a landmark agreement addressing concerns raised by U.S.
autoworkers.280 The terms of the agreement include a number of provisions
270
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272
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TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, at A17; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.Korea Trade Discussions Update (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pre
ss-office/press-releases/2010/october/us-korea-trade-discussions-update.
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to give the U.S. auto industry breathing room to compete with auto imports
from Korea and to make plans to export autos to Korea. For example, the
agreement now allows the U.S. a five-year phase out (as opposed to
immediate lifting) of the 2.5% tariff on cars imported from Korea and a 25%
U.S. tariff on imported Korean trucks would remain in place for seven years,
with a reduction to 0% by year ten.281 Korea also agreed to cut its tariff on
autos imported from the U.S. in half, to 4%, and to cut immediately a 10%
tariff on trucks imported from the U.S.282 This agreement made KORUS
FTA much more attractive to the automotive industry, which feared an
inability to compete with Korean imports without such a tariff agreement.283
Similar to the issues with the Chinese tire tariffs, the agreement resulted
in a divided opinion among labor. Two powerful unions, both focusing on
the potential for exports to Korea, immediately supported the deal—the
United Automobile Workers and the United Food and Consumer Workers
(meat exports).284 In contrast, the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (IAM) issued a strongly worded statement in
opposition, asserting that the agreement “fails to make any improvements on
the inadequate Bush labor standards.”285 Likewise, the AFL-CIO and USW
opposed the new provisions, making blanket statements that the agreement
still lacks adequate provisions to protect American workers.286 Neither union
offered any specifics about what provisions they would like to see
included.287
An updated LAC report reflected this relief and praised President
Obama’s decision to renegotiate aspects of KORUS FTA to “seek a better
deal for U.S. auto assembly workers.”288 Although the LAC report expressed
some concerns, such as that some of the trade safeguards might not be useful
281
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in practice and that the special dispute resolution procedures do not allow
participation by nongovernmental interested persons (e.g., unions), the report
supports the supplemental agreement overall.289
B. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
As soon as the U.S. reached the agreement with Korea, the U.S.
intensified its engagement with Colombia and Panama with the goal of
resolving differences to bring all three agreements to Congress.290 The
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia FTA) was
signed on November 22, 2006.291 Following the Bipartisan Agreement, the
Colombia FTA was amended to reflect the new requirements, including
those regarding labor.292 Specifically, the “key amendments include
obligations related to five basic ILO labor rights,” which would be fully
enforceable through the dispute settlement mechanism.293 “[T]he Colombian
Senate ‘overwhelmingly’ approved” the agreement on October 30, 2007,294
and its Constitutional Court completed its review in July 2008, concluding
that the Agreement conforms to Colombia’s Constitution.295
The labor provisions in the main text of the agreement strengthened
worker protections. Prior to the Bipartisan Agreement, the Colombia FTA
“only required the signatories to strive to ensure that their domestic laws
would provide for labor standards consistent with internationally recognized
labor principles.”296 The initial LAC report was very critical, stating that
“[t]he labor provisions of the Colombia FTA . . . will not protect the
fundamental human rights of workers in either country.”297 The report was
289
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particularly critical in noting that the “complete lack of effective measures is
particularly troubling given the well-documented violations of trade union
rights in Colombia, up to and including the torture and murder of trade
unionists by state actors or paramilitary groups that enjoy, at the very least,
the tacit support of the military.”298
In its final form,299 the Colombia FTA contains enforceable provisions
very similar to those in KORUS FTA. The Labor Chapter (Article 17)
specifically incorporates the key “template” requirements: each Party must
“adopt and maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO
Declaration;300 “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor
laws”;301 “[n]either Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its
obligations with the fundamental rights set forth in the agreement;302 and
“[e]ach party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest in a
particular matter have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of
the Party’s labor laws.”303 It is important to note that “[t]o establish a
violation of [Article 17 regarding fundamental rights,] a Party must
demonstrate that the other Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute,
regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties.”304 If there is a violation of Chapter 17, the aggrieved Party may
seek labor consultations and, if that is not successful, dispute resolution as
provided for in Chapter 21 (Dispute Settlement).305 Importantly, the “[l]abor
obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement, enforcement
mechanisms, and criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as other
obligations under the trade agreement.”306
Significant tariff reductions make the Colombia FTA attractive to
business. For example, market access would be significantly improved for
U.S. exporters to Colombia.
The agreement would provide for the elimination of tariffs on
bilateral trade in eligible goods. Colombia’s average tariff on
NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY 3 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.govarchive/assets/Tra
de_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file671_9845.pdf.
298
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U.S. goods is 12.5% while the average U.S. tariff on
Colombian goods is 3%. Colombia applies tariffs in the 0%–
5% range on range on [sic] capital goods, industrial goods, and
raw materials; 10% on manufactured goods with some
exceptions; and 15% to 20% on consumer and “sensitive”
goods. Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate
80% of duties on U.S. exports of consumer and industrial
products to Colombia. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would
receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation
and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years
after implementation.307
Despite these economic benefits, however, ongoing concerns about
violence in Colombia against labor advocates and the lack of protection of
internationally recognized labor rights has prevented the Colombia FTA
from gaining support in the U.S.308 Major U.S. trade unions, including the
AFL-CIO, Teamsters, United Auto Workers, and USW, expressed their
opposition to the revised agreement in a letter to Congress.309 Citing the
“ongoing high rates of violence against trade unionists and continuing
impunity for the perpetrators of that violence,” they urged “for a
reconfiguration of U.S. policy towards Colombia” to avoid “promoting a
race to the bottom in terms of wages, working conditions, and respect for the
basic rights of workers.”310
There have been ongoing reports of violence and other egregious acts
against workers in Colombia.311 According to one report, forty-six unionists
were murdered in Colombia, and, over the last twenty-five years, 2,850 trade
unionists have been murdered there.312 Another significant labor issue in
Colombia is the use of Associative Labor Cooperatives (Cooperatives), a
307

Id. at 4.
February 2011 Kirk Testimony, supra note 290.
309
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situation in which workers are hired through subcontractors.313 According to
the Washington Office on Latin America, the use of Cooperatives
“undermines worker protections and labor rights,” especially in certain
sectors, such as the sugar industry.314 As USTR Kirk emphasized, “these
issues go to our core U.S. values and interests, such as the protection of labor
rights. . . . We will not sign agreements just for agreements’ sake. They must
be enforceable and of the highest standard and in the interests of America’s
workers, farmers, businesses and entrepreneurs.”315
In an effort to address these serious issues head-on, trade negotiators
worked with the Colombian government to develop the Colombian Action
Plan Related to Labor Rights (Action Plan).316
The Action Plan
memorializes Colombia’s agreement to take action to “protect internationally
recognized labor rights, prevent violence against labor leaders, and prosecute
perpetrators of such violence.”317 Pursuant to the Action Plan, Colombia
agrees to take action by creating a specialized Labor Ministry to implement
and enforce labor rights; hiring 480 new labor inspectors over a four-year
period, with 100 to be hired during this year; reforming the Criminal Code
by establishing penalties for employers that undermine the right to bargain
collectively; amending the law to prevent the misuse of workers in
Cooperatives; implementing a regime to prevent the use of temporary service
agencies to circumvent labor rights; amending the Criminal Code to make it
a crime to use collective pacts to undermine the right to organize and bargain
collectively; and developing protection programs for union activists and
criminal justice reform to support prosecutions involving union members and
activists.318 The Action Plan contains concrete steps to be undertaken to
address the serious shortcomings in each of these areas.319
Reaction to the Action Plan has been mixed. The U.S. Labor Education
in the Americas Project criticized the agreement as inadequate because it
(1) does not require an actual reduction in violence against
trade unionists or advances on impunity, (2) is limited only to
313
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labor issues and does not address a wide range of other
concerns, including human rights violations, militarization,
impact on agriculture, internal displacement and the rights of
Afro-Colombians, and (3) provides no way to ensure
compliance once the Colombia FTA is implemented.
Consequently, prominent labor and human rights groups have
joined leading Colombian trade union organizations in
denouncing the agreement as woefully inadequate as a
sufficient condition for approval of the FTA.320
Expressing concern about the lack of union involvement in the Action Plan
and the potential lack of enforcement, the Colombian Unitary Confederation
of Workers and the Colombian Confederation of Workers issued a joint
declaration opposing the Action Plan and the trade agreement.321 In contrast,
the Action Plan and the Colombian Trade Agreement is supported by two
other major Colombian labor unions—the General Labor Confederation and
the Union of Workers in the Apparel and Textile Industries of Colombia.322
Colombia’s National Labor School also endorsed the Action Plan.323 In the
U.S., the USW and Teamsters continue to oppose the Colombia Trade
Agreement, expressing concern about ongoing violence and the need to make
sure that the Action Plan is fully implemented and enforced.324 Underscoring
the immediacy of the problems in Colombia and the urgency of concerns, a
Colombian labor rights lawyer who represented sugarcane workers was left
in critical condition after an assassination attempt.325 This incident prompted

320
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lawmakers to reexamine the timing of the Colombia FTA until there is
“ ‘tangible evidence’ that workers’ rights are being protected.”326
Against this backdrop, just a little more than two months after the Action
Plan was memorialized, USTR Kirk announced that Colombia “met the
milestones slated for completion by June 15, 2011.”327 The significant steps
taken by Colombia to comply with the Action Plan include:
• Secur[ing] legislation establishing a separate Labor
Ministry to provide better institutional capacity to protect labor
rights . . . [and] legislation to establish criminal penalties,
including imprisonment, for employers that undermine the
right to organize and bargain collectively or threaten workers
who exercise their labor rights. The law includes a provision
making it a crime to offer a collective pact to non-union
workers that has superior terms to those offered to union
workers.
• Accelerat[ing] the effective date from July 2013 to June
2011 of new legal provisions, including significant fines, to
prohibit and sanction the misuse of cooperatives and other
employment relationships that undermine workers’ rights.
• Issu[ing] regulations that implement these new legal
provisions on cooperatives and other employment
relationships, clarify earlier cooperatives laws, and ensure
coherence among these laws.
The regulations include
significant fines for companies that violate these laws and
create tools for the Government to promote the establishment
and maintenance of direct employment relationships between
the user companies and affected workers. The new regulations
also strengthen and clarify rules to ensure that only legitimate,
autonomous, and self-directed cooperatives are allowed to
operate. . . .
• [Strengthening] the government protection program for
threatened union activists, [by] reduc[ing] by 75 percent the
326
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backlog of risk assessments for those unionists applying for
protection.
• Issu[ing] internal guidance to prosecutors to accelerate
action on labor violence cases with leads, including a special
focus on the priority labor cases identified by Colombian labor
unions as well as labor violence cases from recent years.
• Develop[ing] a plan to strengthen the capacity and number
of prosecutors and judicial police investigators in regional
offices of the Prosecutor General. . . .
• [Beginning the hiring of] 100 additional labor inspectors
and budget[ing] for the hiring of 100 more labor inspectors in
2012, as part of a commitment to double the labor inspectorate
by hiring 480 new labor inspectors over the next four years.
• Assign[ing] 50 of these new labor inspectorate positions
exclusively to cases involving cooperatives, and 35 of the
remaining 50 new positions to address abuses of workers’
rights in the priority sectors of palm oil, sugar, mines, ports,
and flowers. . . .
• Establish[ing] a robust enforcement regime to detect and
prosecute the use of collective pacts to undermine the right to
organize and bargain collectively, including through preventive
inspections of all companies in which both union-negotiated
collective bargaining agreements and collective pacts are
present. . . .
• Expand[ing] the scope of the existing government
protection program for union leaders to also provide protection
for labor activists (such as shop stewards and bargaining
committee members), workers who are trying to organize or
join a union, and former union activists who may be threatened
because of their past activities on behalf of workers.328
Despite the fact that Colombia was given until December 15, 2011 to
complete most of the remaining obligations under the Action Plan,329 the
Colombia FTA was ratified in October 2011.330 At this point, it is unclear if
Colombia fulfilled its remaining obligations. Unfortunately, because the
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Action Plan is a side agreement, not a mandatory obligation under the main
trade agreement, it will be difficult to enforce any unfulfilled obligations if
the requirements exceed Colombia’s responsibilities under Labor Chapter
17.331
C. United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement
Compared to the issues surrounding the KORUS FTA and Colombia FTA
agreements, the Panama Free Trade Agreement (Panama FTA) was much
less controversial. The U.S. and Panama signed the agreement on June 28,
2007, and Panama approved the agreement shortly thereafter on July 11,
2007.332 The same labor and other issues affecting KORUS FTA and the
Colombia FTA agreements delayed Panama FTA until the entire package of
agreements was presented for ratification.333
As was the case with KORUS FTA and Colombia FTA, the LAC report
was written before the May 10th Bipartisan Agreement labor provisions were
added to the Panama FTA.334 The major criticisms, such as the lack of
enforceable provisions regarding ILO obligations, the fear of “weakening or
reducing the protections,” and the lack of a requirement that Panama
“effectively enforce its own laws” were obviated by the inclusion of
significant protections provided for in the Bipartisan Agreement.335 In terms
of actual labor problems in Panama, the LAC report notes problems for
temporary employees in the retail industry regarding discharge; limitations
on the freedom of association; denial of the right to organize and bargain
collectively; improper limitations on the right to strike; denial of workers’
rights in the Canal Zone; limitations on the rights of public sector employees;
problems with trafficking women for forced labor; and unenforced minimum
age for the employment of children.336 Although these are all issues that
need to be resolved, they are nowhere nearly as problematic as the labor
issues and violence in Colombia.
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In its final form, the Panama FTA contains enforceable provisions very
similar to those in KORUS FTA and the Colombia FTA. The Labor Chapter
(Article 17) specifically incorporates the key “template” requirements: each
Party must “adopt and maintain” the five fundamental principles in the ILO
Declaration;337 “[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor
laws”;338 “[n]either Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from” its
obligations with the fundamental rights set forth in the agreement;339 and
“[e]ach Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest in a
particular matter have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of
the Party’s labor laws.”340 It is important to note that, “[t]o establish a
violation of [Article 17 regarding fundamental rights] a Party must
demonstrate that the other Party has failed to adopt or maintain a statute,
regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or investment between the
Parties.”341 If there is a violation of Article 17, the aggrieved Party may seek
labor consultations and, if that is not in successful dispute resolution as
provided for in Chapter 20, Dispute Settlement.342 Importantly, the labor
obligations are subject to the same dispute settlement, enforcement
mechanisms, and criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as other
obligations under the trade agreement.343
VII. THE FUTURE: LABOR AND TRADE
But are we so sure that globalization is here to stay? That
economic internationalization carries in its wake the eclipse of
national politics? . . . We should by now have learned that
politics remains national, even if economics does not.344
This quote captures the essence of the struggle between labor and trade:
labor is very political at home, but the reality is that we live in a global
337
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economy. Americans need to understand that the job landscape is changing.
If the vision of Labor Secretary Solis is that the Department of Labor works
to create “ ‘Good Jobs for Everyone’ ” and that “[f]ostering fair working
conditions in the global marketplace is one of the Department’s five key
goals,”345 then trade policy should continue to incorporate domestic and
international worker concerns. This policy needs to help workers adjust to
different opportunities and also offer them protection from unfair
competition. What the U.S. should not do, however, is to engage in
isolationist practices to insulate workers from competing worldwide.
This trade strategy will require distinguishing between hyperbolic rhetoric
and concrete concerns. For example, with regard to the trucking dispute with
Mexico, unions had substantial concerns about the safety of Mexican trucks
when NAFTA went into effect. The Teamsters Union and other affected
U.S. workers had every right to speak out, demanding the trucks from
Mexico meet the same standards as U.S. trucks. The March 2011 plan,
however, contains a rigorous set of requirements with which Mexican trucks
must comply. It is disingenuous now for labor to mount general opposition
to the plan. If the plan is insufficient, then specific recommendations,
instead of sweeping general anti-trade statements should be offered to
strengthen the measures.
The situations involving Chinese tires and the USW Section 301 petition
on green technology raise other issues. By placing tariffs on certain tires
imported from China, the Obama Administration helped one group of
workers and secured the support of some labor groups. This, however, was
at the expense of consumers and other workers. While there may have been
short-term political gains, the long-term effect may be detrimental;
unnecessarily damaging trade relations with China. In contrast, the USW
301 Petition makes very effective use of an established trade remedy. With
regard to the Special Fund for Wind Power Technology, it appears that
pursuing WTO action was justified to level the playing field. It may also be
the case that the U.S. should pursue action on rare earth elements. In this
case, labor—the USW—is playing an important role, calling into question
problematic practices. Accordingly, labor can play a significant and useful
role in affecting trade policy, but it must be based on facts that show an
undermining of fair trade.
345
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With regard to trade agreements, the shortcomings of labor protections in
CAFTA-DR are abundantly clear. This is illustrated by the ongoing attempt
to address systematic labor problems in Guatemala. The labor provisions in
the newest free trade agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama reflect
a significant improvement, yet they fall short. The U.S. should continue to
seize the opportunity to implement measures in trade agreements that are
designed to influence labor practices in other countries.346 Future trade
agreements should continue to include commitment to all of the elements
agreed to in the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan Agreement summarized as
follows,
(1) Commitment by the U.S. and its trading partners to
adopt and maintain in domestic law the five
fundamental labor rights as stated in the 1998 ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work:
▪ Freedom of association, as well as the right to
form and join a union;
▪ The right to collective bargaining;
▪ Elimination of all forms of compulsory or
forced labor;
▪ Effective abolition of child labor and a
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor;
and
▪ Elimination of employment and occupation
discrimination based on gender, race, or other
factors.
(2) Commitment not to waive or otherwise fail to apply
labor laws in a manner affecting trade and
investment.
(3) Commitment to effectively enforce fundamental labor
rights, as well as wage and hour and occupational
safety and health laws.
(4) Commitment to establish procedures that allow
members of the public to raise concerns about labor
violations directly with either of the two
346
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governments, which must be reviewed and
considered.
(5) Commitment to guarantee workers and employers
access to tribunals where rights can be enforced and
to ensure that proceedings before those tribunals are
fair, equitable, and transparent.
(6) Commitment to improve labor standards and to
cooperate on a wide range of labor issues, including
labor relations, labor inspection, employment
opportunities and working conditions.
(7) Commitment to the same level of dispute settlement
accountability for meeting labor obligations as for
meeting commercial obligations. Available remedies
for violations of labor commitments will include trade
sanctions and fines.347
With regard to the ILO obligations, the U.S. needs to review its own laws
to ensure that it is fully compliant with its obligations. Although the U.S. has
laws in place related to each of the fundamental principles, it has not ratified
all of the ILO’s conventions related to each. As illustrated by the following
chart, as of July 1, 2011, the U.S. had only ratified two of the eight
conventions:348
CONVENTION

NAME

#87
#98
#29
#105
#138
#182
#100
#111

Freedom of Assoc. (1948)
Right to Organize (1949)
Forced Labor (1930)
Abolition of Forced Labor (1957)
Child Labor (1973)
Elim. Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999)
Equal Remuneration (1951)
Discrimination (1958)

U.S. RATIFICATION
---1991
-1999
---

Moreover, to the extent that the goal is to increase workers’ rights and
level the international playing field, it would be useful to build on this
foundation and incorporate additional provisions. For example, to the extent
347
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that a party’s laws are inconsistent with their ILO obligations, benchmarks,
similar to the provisions in the Cambodia Textile Agreement,349 should be
set with a schedule of changes that need to be made with free trade benefits
tied to a clear and relatively short phase-in of those changes. 350
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whether they want to or not, workers in the U.S. must compete globally.
As President Obama stated:
Rather than fear the future, we must embrace it. I have no
doubt that America can compete—and succeed—in the twentyfirst century. And I know as well that more than anything else,
success will depend not on our government, but on the
dynamism, determination, and innovation of the American
people.351
As the international workforce shifts, programs such as the TAA are
essential to help workers transition into other positions. As illustrated by the
trade disputes involving Chinese tires and China’s Special Fund for Wind
Power Manufacturing, remedies are available under existing trade law to
prevent the U.S. from being subjected to unfair competition. Although some
of the agreements the U.S. has entered into in the past failed to fully protect
workers, new agreements incorporate much more robust provisions. As
noted in the recommendations, there is always room for improvement as the
U.S. moves forward negotiating agreements with other trading partners.
Hopefully, labor will continue to play a responsible role in trade, avoiding
protectionist bravado and promoting rights for workers worldwide.
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